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This paper studies the possibility of using the broad monetary aggregate M2 to target the
quarterly rate of growth of nominal GDP. Our findings indicate that the Federal Reserve could
probably guide M2 in a way that reduces not only the long-term average rate of inflation but also
the variance of the annual rate of growth of nominal GDP. An optimal M2 rule, derived from
a simple VAR, reduces the mean ten-year standard deviation of annual GDP growth by over 20
percent. Although there is uncertainty about this value because of both parameter uncertainty
and stochastic shocks to the economy, we estimate that the probability that the annual variance
would be reduced over a ten year period exceeds 85 percent.
A much simpler policy based on a single equation linking M2 and GDP is shown to be
almost as successful in reducing this annual GDP variance. Additional statistical tests indicate
that M2 is a useful predictor of nominal GDP. Moreover, a battery of recently developed tests
for parameter stability fails to reject the hypothesis that the M2 -GDPlink is stable, but the MI
-GDPand monetary base -GDPrelations are found to be highly unstable. This evidence
contradicts those who have argued that the M2 -GDPrelation is so unstable in the short run that
it cannot be used to reduce the variance of nominal GDP growth.
Martin Feldstein James H. Stock
NBER Kennedy School of Government
1050 Massachusetts Avenue Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBERThis paper examines the feasibility of using a monetary aggregate to influence the path of
nominal GDP with the ultimate goal of reducing the average rate of inflation and the instability
of real output. We measure the strength and stability of the link between the broad monetary
aggregate (M2) and nominal GD? and we assess the likelihood that anactive rule for modifying
M2 growth from quarter to quarter would reduce the volatility of nominal GD? growth.
Our general conclusion is that the relation between M2 and nominal GD? is sufficiently
strong and stable to warrant a further investigation into using M2 to influencenominal GD? in
a predictable way. The correlation between nominal GD? and past valuesof M2 is, of course,
relatively weak, so the ability to control nominal GD? is far from perfect. Nevertheless,the
evidence suggests that a simple rule for varying M2 in response to observed changes in nominal
GD? would reduce the volatility of nominal GD? relative to both the historic record and the
likely effect of a passive constant-money-growth-rate rule. Our calculations indicatethat the
probability that this simple rule reduces the variance of annual nominal GD? growth over a
typical decade is 85%.
The paper begins in section 1 with a discussion of the goals of monetary policy and of the
specific form in which we shall assess the success of alternative monetary rules.Section 2
presents several alternative monetary policy rules that will be evaluatedin the paper. Section 3
then discusses three issues that must be resolved if a monetary aggregate is to be usefulfor
targeting nominal GD?. These include not only the strength and stability of thelink between
nominal GD? and M2 but also the apparent inability of the Federal Reserve to control M2in
the short-term and the risk that a more explicit use of a monetary aggregate to targetnominal
GD? would weaken the statistical relationship that we have found in the historic evidence (i.e,
the so-called 'Goodhardt's Law problem
In section 4 we present evidence about the strength of the link between M2 and nominal
GD? and discuss Granger causality tests for the entire sample and for subsamples.Section 5
presentsmore explicit tests of the stability of the link between M2 and nominalGD?. Our
-1-focus on M2 reflects a belief that s broad monetary aggregate is likely to have a stronger and
more stable relation with nominal GD? than a narrower aggregate. We teat thia assumption in
section 6 by examining the strength and stability of the link from the monetary base and Ml to
nominal GD?, and find strong evidence of instability in both the base/GD? and MI/GD?
relations. There is a large literature on the link from financial variablea to output (recent
contributions include Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Friedman and Kuttner (1992)) and our
results on the apparent usefulness and stability of the M2/GD? relation are at odds with some
of it. As we explain, this is due to our focus on nominal rather than real output, to particulars
of specification (we explicitly adopt an error-correction framework), and to our use of recently
developed econometric tests for parameter stability.
Sections 7 and 8 then derive an optimal rule for targeting nominal GD? in a simple model
and compare its performance with simpler alternative rules. Although a considerable amount
has been written on the theory of nominal GD? targeting, fewer studies have examined the
practical aspects of nominal GD? targeting; notable exceptions are Taylor (1985), MeCsllum
(1988, 1990), Pecchenino and Raache (1990), Judd and Motley (1991, 1992), and Hess, Small and
Brayton (1992), The investigation in sections 7 and 8 is in the spirit of these studies, except
that we focus on probabilistic statements about the size and likelihood of improvements
resulting from using M2 to target nominal GD?. Section 9 examines the predictive validity of
our M2-bssed time series models by comparing them with private forecasts. Section 10 then
returns to the question of the Federal Reserve's apparent inability to control the M2money
stock snd discusses how that problem could be remedied by broader reserve requirements with
interest paid on those reserves.
-2-1. The Goals of Monetary Policy
The widely agreed goals of monetary policy are a low rate of inflation (price stability) and
a small gap between actual real GD? and potential real GD?. There is general agreement that a
low long-term rate of inflation can be achieved by limiting the rate of growth of a broad
monetary aggregate sufficiently over a long enough period of time.
The monetary policy rules that we consider in this paper are all compatible with achieving
any particular long-run average rate of inflation. Moreover, in the models that we consider,
the short-term monetary policy rule that is selected does not affect the ability to achieve a low
long-term average level of inflation. Technically, we are assuming that the Federal Reserve
could set the long-run inflation rate by the identity that mean inflation equals mean money
growth plus mean velocity growth less mean real output growth. Empirical evidence suggests
that the long-run mean of the growth of M2 velocity is zero (a consequence of the long-run
money demand functions reported in section 4 Although there is much interesting research on
the relation between long-term real output and long-term money growth (a recent empirical
contribution is King and Watson (1992)), the problem of setting the means is separate from the
problem of short-term stabilization considered here. In this sense, any gains achieved by short-
run stabilization are gains in addition to those achieved by choosing the average money growth
rate which achieves low long-run inflation.
The general goal of reducing the gap between actual and potential GD? in the short and
medium term can be made more precise in a variety of ways. This paper takes the approach of
evaluating economic performance by the variance of the quarterly nominal GDP growth rate.
This focus on the variance of nominal GD? implies giving equal weights to short-term
variations of inflation and of real output. Alternative measures of short-term performance that
might instead be used include the variance of real GD? growth and the mean shortfall of real
GD? from potential GDP. Although such measures would ignore the short-term variation in
inflation rates, the desired low long-run average rate of inflation would be assured by setting
the appropriately low mean growth rate of the monetary aggregate.
-3-Judging performance by the variance of the nominal GD? growth rate is equivalent to
targeting the growth rate of nominal GD? rather than a path of nominal GD? levels. Although
this distinction has no implication for the long-term inflation rste, it does affect the optimal
response of policy to short-term shocks to the economy. In particular, the implicit desired
future path of nominal GD? is always independent of the starting point.
This can be seen more clearly by contrasting the target of minimizing the variance of the
nominal GD? growth rate (around its mean for the entire sample) with the alternative target of
minimizing the variance of nominal GD? around a trend with an exponential rate of growth
equal to the sum of the desired rats of inflation and the mean real GD? growth rate in the
sample. If the economy starts on the trend line, the two criteria are the same for the first
period. But any departure from the trend during the first period implies a different ttandard
for the second period The criterion of minimizing the variance of the nominal GDPgrowth
rate ignores any 'base drift" in nominal GD?. It can be thougth of as minimizing the variance
around the trend line with the starting point of the trend rebated in each period to the actual
level achieved in the previous period.
Which of the two approaches it preferable depends on the types of shocks that are most
likely to be encountered, the differential effects of money on real output and inflation, and the
ultimate objective of monetary policy. For example, if in the extreme real output is a random
walk and unaffected by monetary policy then a nominal GDP level target will result in theprice
level being a random walk, so that the future price level will deviate arbitrarily far from its
desired fixed level. On the other hand, minimizing quarterly fluctuations in the growth of
nominal GD? will result in constant (say, zero) inflation and the future price level is stabilized.
Similarly, if the growth rate of potential real GD? varies significantly from quarter toquarter,
minimizing the variance of the growth rate would be the better policy. The alternative of
minimizing the variance from a prespecified nominal GD? path would require a contractionary
policy after a positive productivity shock even though there had been no increase in inflation
and an expansionary policy after a negative productivity thock even though there had beenno
decrease in inflation. We have not explored this issue in the current research.
-4-Our tests of the strength and stability of the link between M2 and nominal GDP are
however relevant whether the criterion by which policy is judged is the variance of nominal
GDP around its mean or the deviations of nominal GDP from a predetermined target path. The
choice of criterion determines how the money stock should vary from quarter to quarter to
minimize the relevant variance.
L Alternative Approaches to Monetary Policy
Although the Federal Reserve is concerned with inflation and real economic activity,
monetary policy must be made by adjusting some monetary variable —amonetary aggregate,
an interest rate or the exchange rate. In this section we discuss three possible approaches. This
is far from an exhaustive set of alternatives, but rather provides a context for comparing an M2
approach to nominal GDP targeting to other commonly discussed options.
2.1 The Status Oup: Judemental Eclecticism
In practice, the Federal Reserve controls the volume of bank reserves (a monetary aggregate)
by open market sales of Treasury securities. In recent years, the volume of such sales has been
adjusted to target the value of the Federal funds interest rate. Thus, for time intervals up to
several weeks, any disturbance in the statistical relation between the Federal funds rate and
bank reserves (ic, in the banking system's bivariate demand function for reserves) induces the
Federal Reserve to alter reserves in order to maintain the desired level of the Federal funds
rate. In this context, the interest rate is the exogenous variable and the volume of reserves is
endogenous. For longer periods of time, the relationship is more ambiguous because the
Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee (FOMC) may revise the Fed funds rate target in part
in response to the magnitude of reserve growth and the corresponding movement of the narrow
monetary aggregate Ml (as well as to other aspects of economic and financial performance).
It is significant that the FOMC now makes decisions and issues operating instructions to the
New York Federal Reserve Bank in terms of the Federal funds interest rate and not in terms of
-5-M2 or some other mooetary aggregate. Each of the individual members of the FOMC may vote
to increase or decrease the Fed funds rate for his or her own reasons. Some members see a
reduction of the Federal funds rate as a way of increasing the rate of growth of M2 and
therefore of subsequent nominal sod real GD?. Others may ignore the potential impact on the
money stock and choose an interest rate change because of what they regard to be the likely
effect on inflation and real output.1 At times, some FOMC members may consider the effect
of changes in the Fed funds rate on the international value of the dollar. Still others may
emphasize the psychological effect of changes in interest rates as an indication of the Fed's
resolve to fight inflation or stimulate economic activity.
We do not try to model and test an explicit interest rate rule for monetary policy or any
other complex judgmental rule. Rather we take the historic record of economic performance as
indicative of what the Federal Reserve can achieve by such an eclectic judgmental policy.
Technically many of the statistics we report, in particular the regression R1s and tests for
predictive content in sections 4 and 6 and the performance measures in sections 7 and 8, should
be interpreted as providing evidence on the ability of alternative policies to improve upon past
performance. Indeed, were past performance optimal in the sense that money had been used to
minimize the variance of quarterly nominal GD?, then we would expect to find no historical
correlation between money and future GD? growth. In contrast, were the historical M2/GD?
relationship strong and stable, this would open the door to an investigation of whether this link
could be exploited to control GD? more effectively than has been done historically.
2.2 ?assive Monetary ?olicy: A Constant Growth Rate of M2
A natural starting place among explicit quantitative monetary rules is Milton Friedman's
proposal for a policy of constant growth of the money supply. Setting the constant growth rate
of money equal to the expected growth of potential GD? minus the expected rate of increase of
velocity implies a zero expected rate of inflation. Small errors in the estimated rate of growth
of either potential GD? or velocity causes correspondingly small departures of inflation from
price stability.
-6-Friedman argues that a constant rate of money growth is actually likely to result in a more
stable path of nominal GDP than a more active monetary policy aimed at achieving such
stability (Friedman (1953)). Friedman's argument can be summarized easily in the framework
in which stability is defined as the variance of the growth rate of nominal GDP. Suppose that
nominal GD? growth consists of two parts, one which would be achieved under a constant
growth rule and one which reflects the impact of an activist rule. Then the variance of
nominal GD? growth is the sum of the variances of these components, plus their covariance.
Friedman's point is that activist policy reduces volatility only if the covariance is sufficiently
negative to offset the additional variance contribution from activist control.
This decomposition provides a useful way to interpret the regression results elsewhere in the
literature and in section 4. If M2 enters significantly, then necessary an optimal or nearly
optimal policy can reduce total volatility. However, if the regression R2 is small, then the gains
from such control will be modest. Moreover, following the 'wrong" policy can increase rather
than decrease output volatility.
13 Active Tareetine Rules for Monetary Policy
McCallum (1988, 1990), Taylor (1985) and others have developed and simulated alternative
rules for managing monetary policy with the aim of stabilizing nominal GD? growth. We build
on this literature in sections 7 and 8 of this paper by proposing an optimal rule for using
monetary policy to target nominal GD? and a simple, partial-adjustment rule that approximates
the effect of the optimal rule.
As part of our analysis of these rules, we calculate the probability that they would reduce
the variance of nominal GD? growth. The specific calculation we perform addresses the
following thought experiment: suppose the Federal Reserve were to adopt a particular nominal
GD? targeting rule and use it for a decade. Based on the data available to us from 1959 to
1992, what is the probability that the variance of quarterly nominal GDP growth would be less
over this ten-year span than it would be under the status quo? What is the expected percent
-7-reduction in the ten-year standard deviation of quarterly GD? growth under the rule and, more
generally, what does the distribution of potential reductions look like? Our statistics answer
these questions, and also quantify the distribution of ten-year variance reductions in two- and
four-quarter growth of GD?. This calculation incorporates both the parameter uncertainty
arising from working with a finite historical data set and the additional uncertainty introduced
by different possible ten-year paths of future shocks to the economy. When the policy rule is
designed to minimize quarterly GD? volatility, we refer to the performance measure applied to
GD? as a performance bound, since by construction the monetary policy is designed to
minimize the population (multiple decade, long data set) value of this ratio. Our calculations
show that in principle the optimal M2 rule would have outperformed status quo policy with a
rather high probability.
The complexity of the optimal rule for varying M2, even in the simple model that we
analyze, suggests that explicit optimization is more relevant as a benchmark than as an actual
prescription for application by the Federal Reserve. We therefore examine simpler partial-
adjustment rules, which are in the spirit of the rules examined by Taylor (1985) and McCallum
(1988, 1990). In particular, the rule for which we tabulate results adjusts M2 40% toward
closing the gap between realized and desired nominal GD? growth. Performance measures for
this simplified rule show that it would have resulted in nominal GDP stabilization close to that
of the optimal rule and better than the implicit status quo policy. Moreover, long-run mean
inflation would be reduced by choosing a lower mean money growth rate. Thus this rule could
result in both lower mean inflation and reduced volatility of GDP growth, relative to the status
quo.
-8-3. The Usefulnessof a MonetaryTargeting Rule: Three issues
The research in this paper shows that an active monetary rule of the type described in
Section 23 and studied in Sections 7 and 8 can in principle achieve a more satisfactory
economic performance (as measured by the rate of inflation and the stability of nominal GDP
growth) than has been achieved by the "eclectic judgmentalism" currently practiced by the
Federal Reserve or than would be achieved by the passive policy of constant M2 growth
proposed by Milton Friedman. We show also that the professional forecasters do not appear to
have an advantage relative to a simple M2-based VAR model at forecasting nominal GD? and
therefore conclude tentatively that monetary activism based on professional forecasts may be no
more satisfactory than policies based on simpler forecasting models.
The conclusion that a monetary rule can "in principle" be useful reflects our finding of a
sufficiently stable link between money and nominal GD?. Two other issues must be resolved
favorably in order to conclude that monetary targeting would be useful in practice as well as in
principle. Briefly, the three requirements for the usefulness of a monetary targeting rule can
be characterized as: (1) a sufficiently stable link between money and nominal GD?; (2)
satisfactory behavior of the Federal Reserve; and (3) a limited system response to the change in
monetary policy.
3.1 A Stable Link Between Money and Nominal GD?
The statistical tests presented in section 4 and 5 show that M2 has predictive content for
nominal GD? and that the relationship appears to have been stable over time. More precisely,
section 4 shows that the link between money and nominal GD? exists for the entire thirty-year
sample. It is strong enough so that Milton Friedman's case against active policy cannot be
based on the absence of an adequate link between short-run variations of M2 and nominal
GD?. The evidence in Section 5 suggests that the parameters have been stable in the sense that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy using several recently proposed
tests for parameter stability.
-9-32 Satisfactory Behavior of the Federal Reserve
Milton Friedman and others base their argument against an activist monetary policy in part
on the claim that there is an inherent inflationary bias in central bank behavioE even if the
Federal Reserve could control M2 completely and knew an optimizing rule for setting M2, they
would violate that rule because of political pressures or other reasons.
There is of course no way to answer that criticism fully. We do note however that the
Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world have over the past decade been
pursuing relatively tough anti-inflationary policies and that those central banks with greater
independence have pursued that goal more aggressively. That is no guarantee about the future
behavior of the Federal Reserve. Those who believe that any central bank that has discretion
will eventually act incompetently or perversely may or may not be right, but they Cannot be
persuaded by evidence.
Nevertheless, if our evidence on the predictive link between money and nominal GDP is
accepted, those who would still advocate a passive fixed-money-growth rule would have to
argue that the gain in terms of reduced inflation that results from such a policy outweighs the
potential benefit in terms of output stability that can be achieved by an active rule-based
monetary policy.
It seems likely, moreover, that any policy based on an explicit quantitative rule is less
subject to political and other pressures than the purely judgmental approach currently pursued
by the Federal Reserve. Perhaps it would be a useful further discipline if the Federal Reserve
were to state the rule publicly and to explain to the financial and policy community whenever
monetary policy did not conform to the rule over a period of, for example, six months, just as
the Federal Reserve now announces a target range for money growth and must explain to
Congress whenever it fails to achieve money growth in that range.
In addition to the question of the Federal Reserve's willingness to use a monetary rule to
target nominal GDP, there is also a more technical aspect about the Federal Reserve's ability to
-10-act in compliance with a rule that requires managing quarterly changes in M2. Recent
experience shows that conventional short-run money demand equations have broken down
(Feinman and Porter (1992) Evidently the Fed has been unable to estimate the volume of
open market operations needed to achieve its desired changes in M2. For example, the increase
of M2 at a rate of only 2.2 percent from the fourth quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of
1992 was below the lower end of the Fed's target range (2.5 percent to 63 percent) at a time
when most Fed officials acknowledged that faster M2 growth would have been desirable. We
return to this problem in section 10 and explain that the Federal Reserve could control M2 by
expanding reserve requirements to include all of the components of M2. Until then, we will
ignore the difference between controlling reserves and controlling M2 and will assume that the
Federal Reserve can control the growth of money from quarter to quarter.
3.3 A Limited System Response to the Chance in Monetary Policy
Even if the relation between money and nominal GDP has been stable in the past, an
attempt to exploit that relation in an optimizing mode could cause a change in these reduced
form parameters. Continuing to assume the old parameter values would lead to suboptimat
results that could, in principle, be worse than those implied by the existing judgmental policies.
There are two sources of this possible instability. First, as discussed in section 10, to
control M2 effectively would entail placing reserve requirements on its components. To the
extent that this changes the M2/nominal GDP relation, the historical correlations upon which
our analysis is based would become less useful. While this effect might take some time to
detect, in principle these relations could be updated using new data and the policy rule
modified to account for the effect of consistent reserve requirements.
The second source is more problematic, and concerns the empirical relevance of the Lucas
critique of all policy analysis. One extreme form of this concern (suggested in a British context
by Charles Goodhardt and known as "Goodhardt's Law") is that trying to use M2 (or any other
aggregate) to target nominal GDP would break the causal link with nominal GDP and make
-11-controlling M2 irrelevant Because we use an explicitly reduced-form model, our calculations
are an obvious target for this critique. However, all extant empirical macro models are
approximations —thereis no compelling reason to think that any empirical macroeconomic
model incorporates the 'deep parameters' stable to policy interventions —sothis criticism is
equally applicable to all exercises in this area, The empirical relevance of the Lucas critique
has been the topic of considerable debate (see for example Sims (1982, 1986)), and we have
little to add on this topic. Yet, we note that the tests of sections 5 and 6 suggest that the
M2/GDP relation —unlikethe Mi/GOP relation, the monetary base/GOP, and the relation
between various interest rates and output —hasbeen stable over the past thirty years, a period
which has experienced several shifts in Fed operating procedures. More generally, the research
of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) that originally established the existence of a link between
money and nominal GOP covered a much longer period of time with even more substantial
changes in monetary policy and economic institutions. This gives reason to hope that further
changes to monetary policy would have limited effects on this relationship. These concerns do,
however, imply that the relation between nominal GOP and M2 should be closely monitored
were the Fed to change its the approach to monetary policy.
4. Strength of the Link from M2 to Nominal GDP
The question taken up in this section is whether M2 has predictive content for future
nominal GDP growth. We address this by considering quarterly historical time series data on
money, output, interest rates and prices over the period 19591 -19922.(Data sources and
transformations are detailed in Appendix A.) Visual inspection of the time series data from
19591 -19922,portrayed in figure 1, indicates a link between the four-quarter growth in M2
and nominal GOP over the business cycle and indeed over longer periods. However, there
appears to be less correlation between M2 and either inflation or real GOP growth.
Econometric evidence on the predictive content of various monetary aggregates for nominal
GOP is presented in table 1. Each row of the table corresponds to a regression of nominal
-12-GDP growth on a constant and three lags of the indicated variable. As discussed in Appendix
A, in these regressions nominal GD?, real GD?, the GD? deflator, and M2 appear in growth
rates; individual interest rates appear in first differences; and spreads appear in levels. The
first numeric column nf table 1 provides theof the regression of the quarterly growth of
nominal GD? against the first through fourth lag of the indicated regressors. The second and
third columns report the 's from regressions of two- and four-quarter growth (current
quarter growth plus growth over the next, or the next three, quarters), respectively, against the
same set of regressors. The final columns report the results of F-tests for predictive content
(Granger causality tests) for M2 and other financial variables entering the regressions.
The results in table 1 suggest that, over the 1959-1992 sample, there has been a systematic
relationship between M2 and nominal GD?: M2 is a statistically significant predictor of
nominal GD? growth at the 1% level in those regressions which include M2 or M2 in
conjunction with inflation and interest rates. M2 is capable of predicting a statistically
significant yet quantitatively modest amount of the movements in output at the one-quarter
horizon; for example, the regressions in rows 7 and 8 indicate that M2 improves the one-
quarter ,relativeto using lagged real GD? growth and lagged GD? inflation, by 0.127.
However, at the four-quarter horizon the improvement from using M2 is more substantial,
increasing theof that regression from .092 to 326. In contrast, while the regressions with
interest rates alone (equation 9 and 10) have comparable if somewhat smaller R2's at the one-
quarter horizon, their R2's at the four-quarter horizon are less than .18.
A conventional question in the literature on the money-output relationship is whether the
inclusion of interest rates eliminates the predictive content of M2 (e.g. Sims (1972, 1980)), For
the current purposes, if true this would suggest that interest rates would make a more
appropriate control variable than Mi The results in table 1 indicate that, for nominal GD?,
this is not the case. For example, when the 90-day T-bill rate or the Fed funds rate is added
to the regression in row 8, M2 remains statistically significant; in fact, thefor the four-
quarter regression declines because of the inclusion of these additional interest rates which
evidently have no additional predictive content at this horizon.
-13-The specifications discussed so far only incorporate short-run relationships, in the sense that
they relate growth rates to growth rates or changes. However, there is substantial evidence that
there is a long-run relationship between the levels of money and output (both in logs) and
interest rates, which can be thought of as a long-run money demand relation, Unit root tests
suggest that velocity and interest rates can be treated as being integrated of order one, and
cointegration tests suggest that these two variables are cointegrated (see for example Hafer and
Jansen (1991), Hoffman and Rasche (1991), and Stock and Watson (1989a)), thus long-run
money demand can be thought of as a cointegrating relation among these vectors. If so, then a
candidate for inclusion in these output regressions is the "error correction" term which is the
residual from the long-run money demand relation. Previous investigationa suggest that a unit
income elasticity is appropriate (see Stock and Watson (1989a) for results and a discussion), so
the money demand cointegrating vector is specified here is ZMDt =ln(Xt/M)-flrRt,where X
is log nominal GDP, Mt is log nominal money, and Rt is the level of the interest rate, here
taken to be the 90-day Treasury bill rate. The interest semi-elasticity of money demand, fl
was estimated by asymptotic maximum likelihood using the Phillips-Loretan (1992)/Saikkonnen
(1991)/Stock-Watson (1989a) procedure, and one lag of the resulting estimate of ZMDt was
entered as an additional regressor in the specifications in table Thus these regressions
correspond to a single-equation error correction model (see for example Hendry and Ericsson
(1991)). Although this motivation for including ZMD stems from the theory of cointegration,
this term has a natural interpretation in a regression of nominal output growth on money: it
controls for deviations in velocity from its long-run value as determined by the interest rate.
The results in table 1 indicate that the long-run money demand residual has noticeable
predictive power, for example, adding ZMD to regression 11 improves the one-quarterby
.063andimproves the four-quarter i? by .078. When the money demand residual is included
in the regression, the hypothesis that money does not enter implies that the lagged first
differences andthemoney demand residual do not enter; thus in the regressions with ZMD the
Granger causality tests for M2 in table 1 test both sets of exclusions (on all lags of M2 growth
-14-and on lagged ZMD The hypothesis that M2 is statistically insignificant in the one-quarter
horizon continues to be rejected in these regressions.
Despite this statistical significance for M2 in these regressions, it should be emphasized that
the 's for these regressions are all rather low. For example, anfor a four-quarter
horizon of 39% (equation 13) indicates that the ratio of the RMSE from using this regression,
relative to using a constant forecast, is only .7& Looking ahead to the question of whether M2
can be used to further reduce the fluctuations in GDP, this inherent relative unpredictability of
nominal GDP growth over the past three decades places a limit on any gains from modifying
the control of M2 relative to the Fed's historical behavior.
Most of the recent research has focused on the relation between money growth and real,
rather than nominal, output (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Friedman and Kuttner (1989,
1992a), Stock and Watson (1989b)). As a basis of comparison, we therefore present econometric
evidence on the predictive content of M2 for real GDP growth in table 2 In the case of real
GDP growth, money has substantial predictive content and continues to enter each of the
regressions at the 1% level.
It is interesting to note that M2 is significant even in the regression with the commercial
paper-Treasury bill spread. Other authors, in particular Friedman and Kuttner (1992a, 1992b)
(also see Bernanke (1992)), have found that the inclusion of this spread in similar regressions
has eliminated the predictive content of money. The main difference between those results and
the results in table 2 is that the F-tests in table 2 include the lagged money demand
cointegrating residual, as well as lags of money growth; the F-statistic on the three lags of
money growth alone in the table 2 regression with the paper-bill spread is 1.68 which, with a
p-value of .175, is not significant at the 10% level. However, the t-statistic on the
cointegrating residual in this regression is 323, and the joint F-test is significant. This
phenomenon is present in the corresponding nominal GDP regression with the paper-bill spread,
in which the F-test on the lags of money alone is 1.76 (p-value .16) and the t-statistic on ZMD
is 3.71 In all other regressions in table 1, however, the F-test on just the lags of M2 growth is
-15-significant at the 5% level.3 This statistical significance of the money demand residual agrees
with recent independent results obtained by Konishi, Ramey and Granger (1992), who find that
the logarithm of M2 velocity is a significant predictor of real GNP growth; however, Konishi,
Ramey and Granger use M2 velocity and thus impose a long-run interest semielasticity of
money demand of zero rather than estimating it as we do here.
The generally low predictive content of interest rates for nominal GD? contrasts with the
findings for real GD?. For example, the regression of real output growth on lags of NGDP,
PGDP, R-90, and the GlO_Gi (the Treasury yield spread) has a four-quarter of .384,
while its four-quarterfor nominal GDP is only .192. This is consistent with previous
results in the literature that emphasize the value of the slope of the yield term curve as a
forecaster of real output (Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Stock and Watson (1989c, 1990)).
5. Stability of the link from M2 to Nominal GDP
This section examines the stability of the direct link from M2 to nominal GD?. In their
investigation of the M2/output relation Friedman and Kuttner (1992a) concluded that much of
the full-sample predictive content of money for both nominal and real income was attributable
to the 1960's, a finding which they attributed to disintermediation during the 1970's and
1980's. As a starting point, we therefore consider whether the main findings of Section 4 are
robust to using the shorter sample with Friedman and Kuttner's (1992a) starting date of 197&3.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of table 1, evaluated over the more recent sample.
In general, M2 has somewhat less predictive content in the later sample, although the
deterioration in forecasting performance is modest. For example, the four-quarterfor the
regression with lagged nominal GD? growth and lagged M2 growth is .30 in the full sample and
is .25 in the later sample. The Granger causality test statistics indicate that M2 continues to be
significant, albeit only at the 5% level in most regressions rather than at the 1% level found in
table 1. Because this sample period is only two-thirds the length of the full sample, one would
-16-not expect to find as strong statistical significance of the monetary variables as over the full
sample even if the relationship is stable. For this reason, a more useful statistic is the marginal
from adding money to the regressions. While the increases remain economically
significant, they drop in the later sample: at the four-quarter horizon, in the regression with
nominal GDP, inflation, and the 90-day Treasury bill rate, over the full sample M2 alone has a
marginalof .149 and, in conjunction with ZMD, of 227; over the later subsample, these
marginalare, respectively, .073 and .185. In the later sample, when interest rates, M2,
and ZMD are included, interest rates are never significant at the 5% level, while M2 and ZMD
are jointly significant at the 5%levelin all regressions.
The results in table 3 contrast with the findings of Friedman and Kuttner (1992a).
Although the primary focus of their investigation was real output, their table 1 presents results
on forecasts of nominal GNP. One of their conclusions was that, over the 1703 -199&.4
sample, M2 ceased to be a significant forecaster of nominal GNP. In a mechanical sense, the
difference between their findings and ours is explained, in order of importance, by: (i) our
inclusion of the error correction term ZMD; (ii) the choice of lag length; and (iii) the alight
difference in sample periods.4 If, as argued in section 4, the cointegrated model applies, then
the error correction term should be included in the regression, and because ZMD includes M2 a
test of whether M2 Granger causes output should test both lags of M2 growth and the error
correction term. Concerning lag length, in the regression on GDP and M2 growth, the first lag
of M2 is significant but the others, considered one at a time, are not, and a joint test of
significance of the fourth lags in the regression suggests choosing the shorter specification. The
effect of including the final six quarters in the sample suggest that the recent slow growth of
nominal output and M2 in the face of low and declining interest rates and a sharply inverted
yield curve has tilted the results somewhat towards M2 as a predictor. While we therefore
prefer the specifications in table 3, those results and Friedmsn and Kuttner's (1992a) findings
suggest investigating further the question of whether the M2/nominal output relation is stable.
The differences between our findings and Friedman and Kuttner's ultimately point to the
-17-limitations of simple regression statistics, and that information of a different type is needed on
the stability of this relationship.
We therefore subject these relations to a series of formal tests for parameter stability. The
overall purpose of these tests is to detect parameter instability when the type of instability is
unknown a-priori. If it were presumed that a break might have occurred at some known date,
then the simplest test for such a break would be s Chow-type test for a shift in the parameters.
However, in practice the date at which the break occurred is typically unknown a-priori and
the candidate break date is based upon knowledge of the historical data. In this case, the
subsequent test statistic does not have its classical sampling distribution, and the precise
sampling distribution will depend on the preliminary method used to select the break date.
(Christiano (1992) provides an empirical example of this point; for the associated econometric
theory, see the July 1992 special issue of the Josrnal of Bssiness and Economic Statistics on
unit root and break-point tests.) The test statistics considered here handle this difficulty by
explicitly treating the break date as unknown.
Three classes of tests are considered. These tests are described in Appendix B and are
briefly summarized here. Tests in the first class look for a single structural break which
occurred at an unknown date during the sample. These tests sre based on the sequence of
likelihood ratio statistics testing the hypothesis that the break occurred in quarter k. The most
familiar of these tests is the Qusndt likelihood ratio statistic (the "QLR" ststistic), which is the
maximum over k of these likelihood ratio statistics; the other two tests sre the average of the
likelihood ratio statistics ("Mesn-Chow") sod sn exponential average of these proposed by
Andrews and Plobcrger (1991) ('AP Exp-W")L As discussed by Andrews sod Ploberger (1991),
these tests are designed to have good power properties sgaiost a single break in one or more of
the regression coefficients. These tests are implemented with trimming psrsmeter A =.15(see
Appendix B). For comparison purposes, we slso report the vslue of the conventional Chow
test, testing for a single brcsk occurring in 1979.3 ('Chow"). However, this date is conventional
in the litersture precisely because is associated with the Fed's chsnge irs operstiog procedures
-18-and thedoublerecessions of1979-1982. Because this break date is at least in part data-
dependent, conventional critical values are inappropriate and proper p-values are not readily
ascertained.
Tests in the second class are similar in spirit to the Brown-Durbin-Evans CUSUM Statistic,
except that the statistics here are computed using the full-sample residuals as suggested by
Ploberger and Kramer (1992a, 1992b These tests are the maximum of the squared scaled
partial sum process of the residuals ('P-K max') and its average ('P-K meansq"). These tests
mainly have power against breaks in the intercept in the regression in question.
Unlike the previous tests, the final class of statistics are derived to have power against
continuously shifting parameters. These tests, due to Nyblom (1989), are derived as LM tests of
the null of constant coefficients against the alternative that the regression coefficients follow a
random walk, although they also have power against single-break alternatives. Two versions of
these tests are considered: the L-all statistic tests the hypothesis that all the regression
coefficients are constant against the random walk alternative, while the L-fin statistic only tests
the constancy of the coefficients on the financial variables (money, interest rates, spreads, and
the money demand cointegrating residual) In practice, these tests often yield different
inferences. Because the various tests were derived to have power against different alternatives,
when used together they can provide insights into which types of instabilities, if any, are
present in these regressions.
The results of these tests are presented in table 4 for the nominal GD? forecasting
regressions in table 1. In all the M2 regressions but one, the only tests which reject at the 5%
levelare the Ploberger-Kramer tests (ignoring the fixed-Chow test, for which we cannot
compute proper critical values because of the partly endogenous break date This suggests that
the constant term in several of these regressions is unstable, but that the coefficients on the
stochastic regressors do not exhibit statistically significant shifts. The only case in which
another test rejects at the 5% level is for regression 5,whichincludes both the Fed funds rate
and the 90-day Treasury bill rate FYGM3: the QLR test rejects with an estimated break in
-19-803. Since neither regressions 3 nor 4 reject using this statistic, this suggest that there might
be some instability in the relationship between the Fed funds-T-bill spread and nominal output
This spread moves with other private-public spreads (Stock and Watson (1990)); in this light, its
instability is consistent with the 10% rejection of the QLR statistic in regression 16, which
includes the commercial paper-Treasury bill spread. Aside from these two regressions with the
private-public yield spreads, the results suggest stable regression coefficients on the stochastic
variables.5
Overall, the results of this section suggest that the predictive content of M2 (as well as other
financial variables) for nominal GD? is somewhat less over the 1970-1992 subsample than over
the full period. However, formal tests for parameter instability fsil to reject the hypothesis
that the M2 -GD?regressions have stable coefficients over the thirty-year sample, except
perhaps for a shift in the iotereept.
6. Links from other monetary aggregates to Nominal GDP
At various times, the Federal Reserve has considered employing alternative financial
instruments as control variables, such as the monetary base, Ml, sod interest rates. lo this
section, we examine the predictive content of these other instruments for nominal GD? growth
sod the stability of these foreessting relationships.
Casual evidence suggests thst the link from other monetary sggregstes to output is less
stable. The Federal Reserve is required by law to announce target ranges for monetary
aggregates. In recent years, the Federal Reserve hss provided target ranges for M2 sod M3 as
well ss for a broader debt aggregate, but no longer provides a target range for Ml. Federal
Reserve officials argue that the payment of interest on most checking accounts (a component of
Ml) has increased the substitutability between Ml accounts and the components of M2 sod
therefore greatly increased the volatility of Ml velocity. Jo the first two quarter of 1992, for
example, at annual rates Ml grew 13.4 percent while nominal GD? increased only 5 percent.
-20-Annual growth rates of the monetary base and of nominal GDP, real GDP, and GDP inflation
are plotted in figure 2. In figure 3, the monetary base is replaced by ML In contrast to figure
1, no clear cyclical link is evident between either the base or Ml and and nominal output.
To investigate these links more formally, we apply the Statistics described in sections 4 and
5toregressions involving base money and ML Evidence on the predictive content of base
money and Ml is presented in tables 5and6.6 The most striking feature of these results is that
the predictive content of these regressions is substantially less than the corresponding regressions
with M2, with four-quarter 's in the range 0.09- 020,compared with 's in table 1 of
almost 0.40. In the regressions with interest rates, the monetary base fails to be statistically
significant at the 5%level,and Ml is no longer significant at the 10% level.
The stability of the base, Ml, and interest rate regressions are examined in tables 7 and 8
using the tests for parameter constancy described in section 5.Thehypothesis of parameter
constancy is rejected overwhelmingly for base money, with every regression having at least one
Statistic which rejects stability at the 1% level. The evidence against stability for Ml is equally
strong. Interestingly all the rejections for Ml result from the break-point tests rather than
from Nyblom's (1989) tests for time varying parsmeters, suggesting a regime-shift in the
parameters rather than a slow evolution. In both the base and Ml regressions, the break date is
estimated to be in the early 1980's, perhaps reflecting the widespread introduction of interest-
bearing checkable deposits during this period. In contrast, the regressions with interest rates
only in table 4 suggest that the interest rate relations are relatively stable. The instability of the
base and Ml regressions provide some insight as to why the base and Ml are insignificant when
interest rates are also included in the regressions: even if these variables have predictive
content, the nature of that predictive content varies over time and the more stable interest rate
relations "drive out" the two narrow monetary aggregates.
Several conclusions emerge from these results. Neither Ml nor the monetary base have
substantial predictive content for GDP over the full 1959-1992 sample, and both aggregates are
no longer significant once interest rates are included in the regressions. Moreover, the link
-21-between these two aggregates on the one hand and nominal GD? growth on the other is
unstable, with the stability tests rejecting in most specifications at the 1% level. While the link
between interest rates and GDP growth appears to be more stable (with the exception of the
term structure spread), the predictive content of interest rates for nominal GDP growth is
substantially less than that of M2.
7. Optimal Nominal GDP Growth-rate Targeting: Performance Bounds
7.1 Methodoloav
We now turn to the task of estimating what the volatility of key economic variables would
be, were the Federal Reserve to follow a nominal GD? targeting rule. Answering hypothetical
questions such as this is central to the empirical analysis of macroeconomic policies. A standard
approach to answering such questions, which we employ, is to adopt an empirical
macroeconomic model, to change one of its equations to reflect the policy rule in question, to
solve the model with this new equation, and then to compute summary Statistics and
counterfsctual historical simulations which illustrate the effects of the change. In the context
of evaluating the effect of nominal GD? targeting, this strategy was used by Taylor (1985),
McCallum (1988), and Pecchenino and Rasche (1990) to evaluate various targeting rules,
although the rules and/or empirical models used in these studies differed.
The empirical models we consider are a series of VAR models of the form (1), The focus
here is on constructing performance bounds which measure the best outcome which the Fed
could achieve were it to adopt a nominal GDP targeting strategy, relative to the performance of
its historical monetary policy. As discussed in Section 3, we therefore make three admittedly
extreme assumptions: that the monetary instrument in question is perfectly controllable; that
the Fed could adopt the GDP targeting rule which was optimal over the 1959-1992 period; and
that changing the rule by which money growth is set does not change the dynamics of the rest
of the system and, in particular, does not change the relationship between money and output,
-22-inflation, and interest rates. Completely satisfying these assumptions are unrealistic and one
could not expect to achieve the performance bound in practice. Nonetheless, the computation
of such a bound is a useful step were the performance bound to indicate little room for
improvement beyond historical Fed policy, there would be little reason to switch to a nominal
GDP targeting regime.
To determine the optimal GD? targeting policy, we adopt the objective of minimizing the
variance of GDP growth. It should be emphasized that this differs from the performance
criterion used by McCallum (1988), who examined the deviation of the level of nominal GD?
from a constant growth path of 3% per year. The key difference is that, in attempting to
stabilize the growth rate rather than the level around a constant growth path, we are permitting
base drift in the target. As discussed in section 1, not permitting base drift has the feature —
whichto us seems undesirable —ofleading to a policy of inflating when nominal GDP is
below its target path but is growing stably at 3% per year, and of tightening when GDP growth
is stable at 3% but GDP is above its target path.
Because of lags in data availability, the Fed is unable to measure shocks to the economy as
they occur. The money control rules considered here therefore set the money growth rate in
the current quarter as a function of economic data through the previous quarter.7
TheOptimalControl Rule.
Theclass of models we work with are VAR's of the form,
(la) =x+A(L)xti+Ay(L)Yti+Axm(L)mti+5xt
(ib) Yt fly +Ay(L)X51+Ayy(L)Yt1+ Ay(L)m1 + Yt
(ic) mt =m+Amx(L)x51+ Amy(L)Yt.i + Amm(L)mti + mt
where x is the growth rate of nominal GD?, Y denotes additional variables, such as inflation
as measured by the GD? deflator, and mt denotes the monetary variable of interest, for example
-23-the growth rate of M2. The model dynamica are summarized by the lag polynomials A(L) and
the error covariance matrix, Z —EEtct'.To implement the optimal control algorithms we
assume that the VAR is stable, that is, the roots of I-A(L)L all fall outside the unit circle. To
simplify exposition we henceforth assume that variables enter as deviations from their means so
that the intercepts can be omitted.
The rules considered in this paper are specified in terms of growth rates of money and
output These rules automatically adjust for historical shifts in the level of velocity because
target money growth rates are computed from past growth rates rather than levels. These rules
do, however, assume a constant mean growth of velocity. Although M2 velocity growth has
had a mean of approximately zero over the 1959 -1992period, in principle it is desirable to
permit the mean growth rate of velocity to change with interest rates, and to consider rules
which adjust for persistent nonzero growth in velocity. Including a levels relation between
velocity and the interest rate in (1) is a natural way to do this, and the result would be a vector
error correction model. The empirical results of section 4 suggest that this error correction
term (the long-run money demand residual) should enter this specification. Although the
general nature of the calculations for a vector error correction model are the same as for the
VAR model analyzed here, the details differ, and the analysis of the vector error correction
model is beyond the scope of the investigation and ia left to future research.
Let ='t''P',zt=xtc')', Azm(L) =[Axm(L)AyM(L)']', and let Azz(L) be
the matrix with (1,1) block Axx(L), (1,2) block Ay(L), (2,1) block Ayx(L), and (2,2) block
Then (1) can be rewritten,
(2a) =Azz(L)Zti+ Azm(L)mti +
(2b) mt =Amz(L)Zti+ Amm(L)mti +
The roots of Azz(L) are assumed to lie outside the unit circle, so that Czz(L)
(I -Azz(L)11exiata. Then (2a) can be written,
-24-(3) =r(L)mt+Czz(L)czt
where r(L) =C(L)Am(L).Let rxm(L) denote the (1,1) element of r(L) and let Cxz(L)
denote the first row of Czz(L).
The optimal control problem is to choose the money growth rule which solves,
(4) mm var(xt) =var[rxm(L)mti+Cxz(L)czt]
Because m is assumed to be a function of data only through the previous quarter, the solution
to this problem has the form, m =d(L)zt,whered(L) solves (4). The solution sets
(5) I'xm(L)mti+Cz(L)czt2
where Cz(L) =72CzL2,so m =rxm(L)'Cz(L)sztiand d(L)
rxm(L)1Cz(L).
The rule m =d(L)sziis expressed in terms of the shocks to the x equations (2a). In
terms of implementation, it is more natural to express the rule in terms of actual historical data.
This mathematically equivalent form of the rule is obtained by expressing EZt1 in terms of the
data using (2a). The optimal control rule thus is,
(6)
where l(L) [1 +d(L)Am(L)L['d(L)[IAzz(L)L]. The controlled system is thus
given by (2a) and (6).
A primary measure of the performance of the optimal rule (6) considered here is the ratio
of the standard deviations of the variables when the system is controlled, relative to the
25 -standard deviation of the variables when the system is uncontrolled. To make this precise, let r•
denote the ratio of the standard deviation of the i-th variable in (1) under the optimal control
rule to its standard deviation in the uncontrolled case. Let F(L) denote the moving average lag
polynomial matrix of the uncontrolled system, that is, F(L) (I-A(L))1, where A(L) is the
matrix lag operator with elements AXX(L), etc. in (1), Let F(L) denote this matrix when the
system is controlled using the optimal feedback rule (6), so that F(L) =[(F(L)0)'
(F(L) 0)]', where F(L) =Czz(L)+ rm(L)d(L)L and (L) d(L)L Let Z
denote the i-th variable in Z1 when the system is controlled (so that Z F(L)czt).




Becausethe coefficients of the VAR (1) are unknown, r must be estimated. A natural
estimator of r1, f1, is obtained by substituting the empirical estimates of F(L), F(L), and E
into (7b). However, in evaluating the distribution of r, two sources of uncertainty need to be
addressed. The first is the conventional sampling uncertainty which arises because only
estimates of the VAR parameters are available. The second source of uncertainty arises
because, for any set of fixed VAR parameters, different shocks to the system will result in
different realizations of Z and Z, so that the ratios of the sample variances computed using
these shocks will differ from the population variances in (7a), Both sources of uncertainty need
to be addressed in estimating the distribution of the performance measures. For example, one
might wish to know the probability of realizing a decade-long sequence of shocks which have
the perverse effect of making the optimal policy destabilizing relative to maintaining the status
quo, that is, the probability of realizing r greater than one simply as a result of adverse shocks.
The statistics reported below estimate the distribution of variance reductions which would
be realized over a ten year span, were the Fed to adopt the optimal policy (6). The first source
-26-of uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, can be handled by conventional means. Because r is a
continuous function of the unknown VAR parameters and because those parameters are have a
joint asymptotic normal distribution, the estimatorhas an asymptotic normal distribution.
In principle, this asymptotic distribution of can be computed using the 'delta' method, although
we employ a numerically more convenient technique (discussed below),
The second source of uncertainty, shock uncertainty, can be handled by considering the
distribution of the sample estimator
(8) rilA,Zh. ={vãr(Z.JA,E, h)/vãr(Z1tIA, E)}½
where vãr(Z11A, Z)) denotes the sample variance of a realization ofof length N (say)
generated from the VAR (1) with parameters A and E, and where vãr(ZA, h) denotes
the corresponding sample variance when Z is generated from the controlled system (2a) and
(6) with the parameters Azz(L), AZm(L), Ezz =ZtZt"and hZm(L). With the additional
assumption thatis normally distributed N(O, E), these parameters completely describe the
uncontrolled system (1) and the controlled system (2a) and (6), Conditional on these
parameters, the statistic (8) is a ratio of quadratic forms of normal random variables, and a
variety of techniques are available for computing this conditional distribution. For example this
can be computed by stochastic simulation, which is the approach used by Judd and Motley
(1991) to estimate ranges of inflation and output growth produced under McCallum's (1988)
monetary base rule (holding constant the model parameters and the control rule), and by Judd
and Motley (1992) in their investigation of using interest rates as intermediate targets.
The measures of uncertainty reported in this and the next section combine the parameter
and shock uncertainty arising from using the optimal rule (6). This was done using Monte
Carlo methods. Specifically, in each Monte Carlo draw a pseudo-random realization of (A, )
wasdrawn from its joint asymptotic distribution; F(L) was computed using the submatrices
Azz(L) and Am(L), using the estimate of hmZ(L) obtained from the historical US. data;
-27-pseudo-random realizations of length N were drawn from from atoehastic steady states of the
controlled and uncontrolled system; and the sample variance (8) was computed. The
distribution of these sample variances estimates the distribution of r given la(L)L8
Throughout, N =40was used, corresponding to a ten-year span.
In general the distribution ofis asymmetric (1byconstruction is nonnegative but can
be arbitrarily lsrge The distribution of r is therefore summarized by its mean, median, and
10%and90% percentiles. In addition, the fraction of realizations of r which would be
expected to fall below one —thatis, to indicate reduced volatility under the control rule —is
also reported.
72 Empirical Results
The optimal control algorithm was applied to two VAR's using quarterly data over the
1959-1992 period. In botb models, the optimal rule minimizes the variance of quarterly
nominal GD? growth, with M2 as the instrument The first model includes quarterly growth in
GD?, quarterly inflation as measured by the GDP deflator, the quarterly growth of interest
rates, and the quarterly growth of Mi This use of growth rates of interest rates, rather than
their changes, differs from the specifications of sections 4 and 5. While this modification hss
negligible effect on the estimated distributions of the performance measures, it prevents interest
rstes from taking on negative values in the simulations used to compute the performance
measures.
Estimated performance measures and their distributions are reported in table 9 for two
systems. Because the objective is to minimize the variance of nominal GD? growth, for
nominal GDP growth these ratios represent performance bounds.
First consider the system in panel A. The point estimate of rGDP is .840, but the mean
and median of the distribution of ten-year realizations of rGDP is somewhat larger,
approximately .88. The mean ratio for four-quarter growth in GDP drops to .76. While the
spread of the distribution also increases, the 90% point remains approximately constant, and the
-28-fraction of realizations of rGDP under one is approximately 90%. In short, over a ten year
span the expected effect of the optimal GD? rule would be to reduce the standard deviation of
annual GDP growth by one-fourth; in nine Out of ten decade-long spans the optimal rule
would result in at least some reduction in the variance of nominal GD?.
The reductions in the volatility of real GD? and GDP inflation (not shown in the table) are
less than for nominal GD?. At the four-quarter horizon, the GD? targeting rule results in a
mean improvement of only 6.6% for inflation and 12.6% for real GDP. However, in two-
thirds of simulated decades the volatility of inflation is reduced, while in three-fourtha of the
decades the volatility of real GDP growth is reduced.
The main findings from this exercise are robust to using the funds rate rather than the 90-
day Treaaury bill rate as the financial variable. In this system, the optimal monetary policy still
reduces nominal GD? volatility in 83% to 87% of the decades, depending on the horizon. The
mean reductions for inflation volatility and real GD? volatility are again more modest than
those of nominal GD?. However,the optimal policy results in reductions of the volatility of
annual inflation and real output in, respectively, three-fifths and three-fourths of the simulated
decades.
73 Counterfactual Historical Simulations and Interpretation
Supposing the Fed had optimally used M2 to reduce GDP volatility, how might the economy
have performed over the 1959 -1992period? Answering this question both is of interest in its
own right and provides a vehicle for illustrating the dynamic interactions in the model.
Because the VAR captures the historical correlations between lagged money and future output,
it is a useful framework for computing the performance bounds reported in the previous
section. It is, however, arguably less well suited for performing counterfactual simulations, for
several reasons. The model does not impose any restrictions implied by economic theory and
thus is at a minimum inefficiently estimated; because structural shocks are not identified (in
the sense of structural VAR analysis), simulated responses to shocks are difficult to interpret.
-29-Nonetheless, the computation of counterfactual simulations sheds light on the dynamic
properties of the model.
With these Caveats in mind, we therefore simulate the path of nominal GD? under the
optimal policy rule. The simulated path is computed using the historical shocks to the first
three equations in the system, with M2 determined using the ex.postoptimalcontrol rule. This
simulated path, computed from the system in panel A of table 9, is plotted in figure 4 along
with the actual path of GD?. The optimal policy rule would have produced markedly different
paths of money and interest rates, but only somewhat different paths of nominal GD?, real
GDP, and inflation, relative to the actual data.
A convenient way to summarize the optimal control rule is in terms of its impulse response
function to shocks to GDP, inflation, and the interest rate; this impulse response function is
d(L) given following (5)Thechange in the log of money in response to a one-standard
deviation error in each of the three equations for the other system variables is plotted in figure
5. These shocks have not been orthogonalized so the impulse responses have no ready structural
interpretation. However, for a given system this impulse response facilitates the comparison of
the optimal rule to the simpler rule examined in the next section.
8. Performance of Alternative M2 Growth Rules
8.1SimolerNominal GD? Tareeting Rules
The optimal rule provides a bound by which to gauge the potential performance of
alternative nominal GD? targeting schemes. As practical advice, however, the rule has some
shortcomings. It involves multiple lags of several variables and thus would be rather
complicated to follow. More importantly, the optimal rule depends on the specified model;
because all empirical models are best thought of as approximations, as long as these
approximations 'fit" (for example, forecast out-of-sample) equally well, there is no compelling
reason to choose the optimal rule from any one model. Thus, it is natural to wonder whether
-30-there are simpler money growth rules which would result in performance nearly as good as that
achieved by the optimal rule, but which are simpler to explain and to implement and which do
not hinge on any one model specification.
In this section we therefore consider alternative, simpler models for targeting nominal GDP.
In doing so, we parallel the investigations of simple money growth rules by Taylor (1985),
McCallum (1988), Hess, Small and Brayton (1992), and Judd and Motley (1991) and extend this
work to the distribution of the performance measures r. The money growth rules considered
here have the partial adjustment form,
(9) (mt -=A(p - xti)+ (l-AXm51 -
whereis the target growth rate of nominal GDP, m is the mean money growth rate, and 0 <
A <L Thus money growth adjusts by a fraction A when realized GDP growth in the previous
quarter deviates from its target value by the amount-
x_1.
It was suggested in section 4 that long-run money demand is well-characterized as a
cointegrating relationship between money, nominal GDP, and interest rates, with a unit income
elasticity. If interest rates are 1(1) with no drift (an empirically and economically plausible
specification), velocity growth has mean zero. Thus m is set to equaland the rule (9)
simplifies to mt =-Axti+ (1-A)mi. As in section 7, the rule (9) is implemented in its
deviations-from-means form, so that m and x are taken to be deviations from their 1960 -
1992averages.
The effect of the partial adjustment money growth rule (9) can be evaluated using the
techniques of section 7.1. For example, the formula (7) for the performance measure r1 is as
described in Section 7.1 except that the rule (9) replaces the optimal rule (6). Econometric
inference concerning the performance measure can also be computed using the procedure
described in section 7.1.
-31-8.2. Empirical Results
The partial adjustment rule (9) was examined on a course grid of values of A between .1 and
i. In general, the performance measures r were insensitive to the choice of A for 2 A .4;
within this range, no value of A dominated in terms of variance reduction at all horizons. The
results for A.4 are shown in table 10 for the two systems analyzed in table 9.
The striking conclusion from table 10 is that this simple partial adjustment rule produces
nearly the same distributions of performance measures as does the optimal rule. The partial
adjustment rule results in a somewhat lower fraction of simulated decades of improved
performance for nominal GDP at the quarterly horizon —only70%, compared with 88% under
the optimal rule —but85% of the simulated decades have reduced annual nominal GDP
volatility. As is the case under the optimal rule, under the partial adjustment rule the
improvements in inflation and real output variability are less than for nominal GDP. However,
the partial adjustment rule still results in improvements in inflation and output in two-thirds of
the simulated decades.
The results in panel B of table 10 indicate that these findings are robust to replacing the 90-
day Treasury bill rate with the funds rate. Overall, according to these performance measures
the simple rule comes close to achieving the reduction in nominal GDP volatility of the optimal
rule and is robust to changing the interest rate used in the specification.
8.3 Counterfactual Historical Simulations and Interpretation
The fact that the simple rule provides a close approximation to the optimal rule suggests that
the counterfactual historical values simulated using the partial adjustment rule will be close to
the counterfactual values based on the optimal rule. This is in fact the case. The actual and
simulated values of annual GDP growth for the system with the 90-day Treasury bill rate are
plotted in Figure 6. A comparison of figures 4 and 6 reveals only slight differences between
the historical values of output growth under the two rules; perhaps the largest difference is the
decline in output in 1972 under the partial adjustment rule.
-32-The impulseresponses of the partial adjustment rule are plotted in figure 7. (These impulse
responsesare the lag polynomial d(L) in the representation mt d(L)szt, which is obtained
by solving (2a) and (9) the plotted impulse response are scaled by the standard deviation of
and so represent responses to one-standard-deviation changes in Ezt.)Althoughthe
simulatedoutput andinflation paths are quite similar under the two rules, the impulse responses
of therulesare quitedifferent.Clearly the partial adjustment rule is not an approximation to
the optimalrule, in thesensethat its impulse response function approximatestheimpulse
response function of the optimal rule.However, its effect onnominal output (andalsoon
inflation and real output) is closetothat of the optimal rule. A partial explanationforthisis
that, as was emphasized in section 4, the estimates of the short-run effectofmoney on output,
while statistically significant, is still rather small so thatratherdifferent money growthpaths
can havesimilar,modest effectsonnominal output and inflation. More generally, these results
indicate that the objective function of the variance of nominal GDPisratherflatwith respect
to various money growth rules.9
9. Adjusting Monetary Policy to Consensus Forecasts
The empirical analysis in sections 7 and 8 uses a simple VAR model to derive and to
evaluate policy rules. This analysis assumes that these low-dimensional models adequately
capture stable historical correlations and that the remaining predictable structure in GDP is
limited. If the VAR's have performed worse than alternative forecasting systems, then one
would be reluctant to place much weight on them in designing or evaluating monetary policy.
This section assesses the predictive performance of our simple VAR model by comparing it to
professional economic forecasts: had our simple VAR models been run historically, would they
have produced forecasts of nominal GDP as good as the historical professional record?
McNees's (1986) comparison of ex-ani'e forecasts indicates that, at least for some economic
variables, VAR's are capable of performing as well or better than conventional professional
- 33.forecasting models. The VAR's examined in McNees's study have more variables and a
different structure than those here, however, so that work does not directly address our models.
We therefore provide evidence on how our models would have performed over this period,
relative to those of private forecasters. Of course, the main problem with such an exercise is
that our models have been estimated on the full sample while the forecasters were operating in
real time wish all the difficulties that entails. Thus a comparison of our full-sample VAR to
real-time forecasts would be quite unfair. Consequently, we examine pseudo out-of-sample
forecasts from recursive regressions with the variables in our VAR's, with the initial forecast
quarter ranging from 1971:1 to 1991:2. For example, the forecast of GD? growth from 1972.1
to 1972.1 is computed on the basis of a regression estimated for the period from 1960'2 to
197ft.4; the 1972.2 to 1972.2 forecast is based on data for 1960'2 to 1972.1; and so forth. The
systems used are those in the previous two sections, with nominal income, inflation, M2, and
the 90-clay Treasury bill rate; systems where M2 and then the interest rate are dropped; and s
system in which oil prices are included.
The professional forecasts considered are the DRI and the ASA-NBER forecasts. The DRI
forecasts are "early in quarter forecasts" released approximately 4 weeks into the first quarter of
the year being forecasted. The survey date of the ASA-NBER survey vsries historically but is
typically between four and six weeks into the first quarter being forecasted. (The DRI and
ASA-NBER professional forecasts are of four-quarter ON? and are evaluated relative to four-
quarter ON? growth.) For comparison we also present the "constant" forecast in which the
forecast is simply the average 4- quarter growth rate of nominal GD? over the 1972.1 to 1992.2
interval.
The RMSE's of the recursive VAR forecasts and of the professional forecasters are given in
table it The RMSE for the DRI and ASA-NBER forecasts are very similar at 2.26. A
comparison with the "constant" forecast shows that the forecasts reduce the mean square error
(the square of RMSE) by approximately one third. The simple three lag recursive regression
that includes lagged values of M2, real GD? and the GD? deflator (line 3 of table ii) has an
-34-RMSE of 237.Addinglagged three month interest rates reduces the RMSE to 2.26, the same
as the DRI and ASA/NBER forecasts. With the addition of oil prices the RMSE of the VAR
forecasts is actually slightly lower than the RMSE of DRI and ASA/4BER forecasts.
The conclusion from table 11 is that the variables used in the Sections 7 and 8 in fact
predict nominal GDP with the same accuracy as either the median of private forecasters in the
ASA-NBER survey or the forecasts issued by DRI. Of course, despite the use recursive
forecasts this is not a true comparison of ex-anleforecasts:we have the advantage of using
final rather than preliminary values of the data and have drawn on the past decade of
experience with VAR's to specify our model. Also, our models are silent on one of the main
features of most professionally-used models, the forecasting of the detailed components of real
output. Still, the results are sufficiently encouraging to lead us to conclude that the systems
simulated in sections 7 and 8 provide a plausible empirical framework for the discussion of
alternative monetary policy rules.
10. The Federal Reserve's Ability to Control M2
Although the Federal Reserve announces broad annual target ranges for M2 growth, the
actual growth of M2 in 1992wasbelow the bottom of the target range and for 1991 was at the
very bottom of the range. In both years the target range was 2.5 percent to 65percent;actual
M2 growth was 2.7 percent in 1991 and 2.2 percent in 1992. Within both years there were
substantial periods of zero or negative growth of M2.
Federal Reserve officials emphasize that they do not control M2 directly. To the extent that
Fed wants to alter M2, it proceeds indirectly based on an estimated statistical relationship
between M2 and the Federal funds rate. If the level of M2 projected by that relationship lies
below the desired level, open market purchases could be used to lower the Federal funds rate
until the projected level of M2 is satisfactory. This might of course cause a conflict between
those who focus on the M2 targets and those who think in terms of the effect of changes in the
-35-Federal funds rate on inflation and real economic activity and thus regard M2 as only a
coincident indicator of nominal GDP rather than as a policy instrument that causes future
changes in nominal GIDP.
Such a conflict did not arise during 1991 and 1992, however, because the Federal Reserve's
statistical relation persistently overestimated the level of M2 that would result from the existing
Federal funds rate. Many Federaj Reserve officials who wanted to see a higher level of M2
believed that M2 was about to increase more rapidly without the need for the further stimulus
of a lower Federal funds rate (and the associated increase in reserves.)
The Fed's indirect and inaccurate approach to controlling M2 is currently necessary because
the link between Federal Reserve policy and the M2 money stock has become very different
from the standard textbook picture.10 In the textbook world, banks must keep reserves in
proportion to their liabilities, i.e., in proportion to the noncurrency portion of the stock of
money. When Federal Reserve open market purchases of Treasury bills increase bank reserves,
banks are automatically induced to increase the noncurrency component of the money stock in
proportion to the increase in reserves.
In reality, however, banks are now required to hold reserves against only a small fraction of
their liabilities. Since reserves are no longer required for time deposits and certain other
liabilities, reserve requirements apply to only about 20 percent of total M2. An open market
purchase of securities by the Fed automatically leads to a rise in Ml (since reserves are required
for almost all of the noncurrency components of Ml) but does not necessarily cause a rise in
Mi In practice, the banks have responded to increases in reserves by substituting low cost Ml
funds (checkable deposits) for the more expensive M2 funds (time deposits). As a result, Ml
has grown very rapidly during 1991 and 1992 while M2 has grown at less than the targeted
leveL
It is possible that a more aggressive trial and error procedure for adjusting reserves (or the
Federal funds rate) might allow the Fed to achieve its desired level of M2 within each quarter.
Fed officials doubt this, however, asserting that the lag between changes in the Federal funds
-36-rate and the subsequent change in M2 is much longer than a quarter. The Fed could eventually
achieve the desired M2 level by trial and error changes in reserves but could not do so in each
quarter.
This problem could be avoided and the Federal Reserve could reassert control over the
quarterly level of M2 if reserve requirements were expanded to all the components of M2.
Throughoutmost of the history of the Federal Reserve System, banks were required to maintain
reserves against both demand deposits and time deposits. But the ratio of reserves to deposits
has been reduced since the 1970s, with the reserve requirements on personal time deposits
eliminated in 1980 and on nonpersonal time deposits in 1990.
The Federal Reserve has reduced reserve requirement ratios and eliminated the reserve
requirements on time deposits to eliminate the implicit tax that is otherwise levied on the banks.
Because the Federal Reserve pays no interest on the funds that the banks deposit as required
reserves, the reserve requirements act as a tax on bank deposits. This tax was particularly
heavy in the 1970s and early 1980s when inflation caused short-term interest rates to be very
high. The reserve requirement tax made it particularly difficult for banks to attract deposits
after the creation of money market mutual funds since such funds are not subject to reserve
requirements at all. More recently, the Federal Reserve reduced the reserve requirement tax as
a way of temporarily increasing bank profitability at a time when banks are under pressure to
increase capital.
Because the Federal Reserve is precluded by law from paying interest on reservei, it has
chosen to reduce and eliminate reserve requirements as the only way to reduce the reserve
requirement tax. If Congress had responded to the higher short-term interest environment of
the 1970s and 1980s by permitting the Federal Reserve to pay interest on required reserves and
by extending reserve requirements to personal deposits, the Fed would have been able to
maintain reserve requirements on all types of bank deposits that are in M2 and would therefore
be better able to control M2 directly.
Extending reserve requirements to time deposits so that all of M2 is subject to the same
reserve requirement while paying interest on those additional required reserves would have no
37 -economic or financial impact as such but would give the Federal Reserve the ability to control
M2 from quarter to quarter.11 Since the banks would obtain the needed additional reserves by
selling Treasury bills to the Federal Reserve, this open market operation would neutralize the
otherwise contractionary macroeconomic effect of the increase in reserve requirements. If the
interest rate paid on the additional reserves is the same as the Treasury bill rate, the interest
that the banks would receive on the additional required reserves would just balance the interest
that they would otherwise have collected on the Treasury bills that they sell to obtain those
additional reserves; the banks would thus be neither better nor worse off financially as a result
of the increased reserve requirements. Similarly, since the Federal Reserve would pay in
interest on the additional reserves the same amount that it receives on the Treasury bills
acquired through the associated open market operations, there would be no effect on the budget
of the Federal Reserve and therefore no effect on the budget of the Federal government. The
only effect would be to increase the ability of the Federal Reserve to control MZ
Achieving accurate control of M2 requires that the same reserve requirement apply to all of
the components of M2. The Federal Reserve historically imposed substantially lower reserve
requirements on time deposits than on demand deposits on the theory that the time deposits
were less liquid and therefore that banks required fewer reserves for prudential and liquidity
purposes. It is important to emphasize that such considerations are irrelevant in the current
context. The reserve requirements must be set uniformly in order to give the Federal Reserve
control over the M2 money stock and not to assure that the banks have adequate liquid reserves.
Since paying interest on time deposits would mean that this increase in the reserve requirements
on such accounts would have no impact on the profitability of the banks or on the budget of
the government, there is no problem with having reserve requirements on time deposits that are
high by historic standards. Failure to do so is likely to mean Federal Reserve inability to
control quarterly changes in M2.
-38-11. Conclusion
Thispaper has studied the possibility of using M2 to target the quarterly rate of growth of
nominal GD?. The evidence that we present indicates that the FederalReserve could probably
guide M2 in a way that reduces not only the long-termaverage rate of inflation but also the
variance of the annual GDP growth rate.
The statistical tests that we present show that M2 is a usefulpredictor of nominal GD?. We
cannot reject the assumption of parameter stability over time using avariety of tests that permit
the data to determine a point at which parameter changesoccur.
A simple optimizing model based on a VAR reduces themean ten-year standard deviation
of annual GD? growth by over 20 percent. Although there isuncertainty about this value
because of both parameter uncertainty and stochastic shocks to theeconomy, we estimate that
the probability that the annual variance would be reducedover a ten year period exceeds 85
percent. A much simpler policy based on a single equation linking M2 and nominalGDP is
shown to be almost as successful in reducing this annual GD? variance.The evidence thus
contradicts those who assert that there is no stable relation betweennominal GDP and M2 and
those who, like Milton Friedman, have argued that the relation isso unstable in the short run
that it cannot be used to reduce the variance of nominal GDP. Theempirical models
considered here are too simplified for us to recommend either of therules considered as
normative and quantitative prescriptions for monetary policy; ata minimum this analysis would
need to be extended to handle data revisions, frequency of dataavailability, and additional
predictive variables. We have argued, however, that our main conclusionthat controlling M2
growth can result in substantial reductions in the volatility of GDPgrowth is robust to the
details of our empirical model and policy rule.
Despite this evidence of a potentially useful link between nominal GD?and M2, there are
two possible problems in implementing this strategy. First, the FederalReserve does not
currently control M2 directly. We show that the link between themonetary base, which the
-39 -Fed now controls, and nominal GD? is too weak anderratic to provide a reliable instrument for
targeting nominal GDP. We explain, however, thatthe Federal Reserve could control quarterly
M2 growth completely by extending reserve requirements toall of the components of M2.
Second, we cannot be certain that a shift of Fed policy tocontrol M2 in this way would not
change the basic reduced form parameters linkingM2 and nominal GDP. We take some
comfort from the fact that many changes in financialinstitutionS and Federal Reserve
procedures during our thirty year sample perioddid not cause significant parameter instability.
These two issues cannot be resolved by empirical research.Each reader will have to decide
whether they are likely to be insuperable problems. We hope not.
This research has encouraged us to extend our investigationin several ways. On a technical
level, the simulations do not allow for a slowly changing mean growthof velocity which would
be linked to long-run trends in interest rates. The Granger causalitytests suggested that
introducing this additional error-correction term (the long-run moneydemand residual) was
empirically warranted. This leads us to speculate that replacingthe VAR's in sections 7 and 8
with vector error correction models will improve the estimated performanceof the money rules
and will produce more meaningful simulations by tying togethervelocity and interest rate
movements.
The objective analyzed here has been to reduce the varianceof quarterly nominal GD?
growth. An alternative rule with considerable appealis one in which the objective is to
minimize the expected square of the GD? gap, that is, the deviationof GD? from potential
GD?. An example of this is the hybrid" rule studied in Halland Mankiw's contribution to this
volume. An alternative objective would be to minimize theone-sided shortfall of real GDP
from the estimated level of potential GD?. In either case,these alternative objectives would
result in monetary policies which are more aggressive whenthe GD? gap is larger, in particular
producing relatively more expansionary monetary policyat a cyclical trough.
Central bankers object to strict rules for controlling M2 because theydo not like the
increased variability of short-term interest rates which wouldresult. An idea worth
-40-investigating would therefore be a monetary policy rule that includesshort-term interest rate
changes as part of the criterion function, e.g., a weightedaverage of the change in the nominal
or real GDP growth rate and in the level of the short-term interestrate.
International experience shows that central banks preferto define their goal as price
stability rather than the control of nominal GDP. It would beinteresting to examine the effects
on nominal and real GDP stability of alternative
monetary policy rules that sought to adjust M2
growth in a way that achieved a desired level of inflation in themedium term.
We expect to return to these important issues ina future paper.
-41-Appendix A
Data: Definitions and Transformations
esdefi0flS
NGDP gross domestic product (biL$,saar)
PGDP gross domestic product:impliCit price deflator
RGDPreal gross domestic product (nominal gdp/pgdp)
M2 money stock:m2(ml+O'nite rps,euroS,g/p&b/dmmmfs&saV&Sm time dep(bilS,sa)
(Citibase series FM2)
MBASE monetary base, adj for reserve req chgs (FRB of StLouisXbil$,Sa) (Citibase series
FMBASE)
R-90interestrate: U.S. Treasury bills,sec mkt,3-mo.(% per ann,nsa) (Citibaseseries
FYGM3)
R-FFinterest rate: Federal funds (effective) (%perannum,nsa) (Citibase FYFF)
R4YR interest rate: U.S. Treasury const maturities,1-yr.(% perann,nsa) (Citibase series
FYGT1)
R-1OYR interest rate: U.S. Treasury const maturities,1O-yr.(% perann,nsa) (Citibase series
FYGTIO)
GlO_Gi R-1OYR minus R-1YR
CP6_G6 6-mo. commercial paper rate minus 6-mo. U.S.T-bill rate (using CITIBASE
definitions, CP6_GM6 FYCP-FYGM6)
POlLproducer price index: crude petroleum (82=lOO,nsa) (Citibaseseries PW561)
ZMDerror from M2 money demand cointegrating relation (unitincome elasticity) as
discussed in the text
-42-All dataaretaken from CITIBASE. All data are quarterly. Monthly data (interest rates and
money supply data) were aggregated to the quarterly level by averaging the data for the months
within the quarter.
Data Transformations
Unless explicitly stated otherwise the data are used after the following transformations: NGDP,
PGDP, RGDP, and POlL enter in first differences of logarithms and interest rates (R-90, R-
FF) enter in first differences. There are three exceptions to this general rule. The long-run
money demand cointegrating relations discussed in section 4 are specified between log velocity
and the level of interest rates. Error correction terms (the money demand error ZMD and the
interest rate spreads CP6...GM6 and Glo_Gi) enter the regressions and tests in sections 4, 5 and
6 in levels. In the VAR's in sections 7 and 8, interest rates appear in growth rates (first log
differences) rather than first differences.
-43-Appendix B
Testsfor Parameter Stability
This appendix summarizes the construction and asymptotic distribution theory of the tests
for parameter stability employed in sections 5and6. The tests apply to the standard time series
regression model, modified to incorporate the possibility of nonconstant parameters:
(Al) y=a+fi'x+ c, t1 T,
whereis a homoskedastic martingale difference sequence with variance 2. The k-i
stochastic regressors x are assumed to be mean zero and integrated of order zero (1(0)). Under
the assumption that the regressors are 1(0), the assumption that they have mean zero is made
without loss of generality under the null, since a constant is included in the regression. (Under
the alternative of changing coefficients, the transformation to mean zero regressors can always
be done, but it changes the time-variation process of the intercept so the power of the tests
discussed below is not invariant to demeaning the data although the asymptotic size is.)
Additional technical conditions are needed to obtain formal distribution theory for these tests.
These conditions are typically weak, for example that sample xt covarianee matrix is consistent
for a positive definite matrix; that x has at least four moments; and that the partial sum
process constructed from c obeys a functional central limit theorem. Note that x may include
laggedassuming there are no unit roots in the y process.
The stability tests employed in sections 5 and 6 examine the hypothesis that the parameters
a and $areconstant, against the alternative that they change one or more times during the
sample. The tests fall into three classes: Chow-type tests for a break at a single, unknown
date; CUSUM-type tests; and Nyblom's (1989) tests of time-varying parameters. These three
classes of tests are described in turn.
-44-A.1 Chow-type Break-point Tests.
These statistics test the null hypothesis, H1y = (a,fi),againttthe alternative,
(A2) H1: (at,fit)=(a,fl),t￿k; =,Th,t>k,
where k is an unknown date, 1 ￿ k ￿ T. Were k known a-priori, then the appropriate test
statistic would be the likelihood ratio (equivalently, Wald) test of parameter constancy, that is,
thc Chow test, say F-r(k). Because k is unknown, a natural modification would be the
maximum of these, say maxkE[t5, Tt5lFT(k), where t0 reflects initial and terminal values for
which the test is not evaluated. This modification was proposed by Quandt (1960) and is
termed the Ouaodt likelihood ratio (OLR) statistic. Optimal tests against the alternative (Al)
were studied by Andrews and Ploberger (1991). No uniformly most powerful test exists in this
problem, even asymptotically and with normal errors, so different tests are powerful against
different alternatives. Two alternative statistics they propose are the mean of the F-statistics
(in general a weighted mean, which has an interpretation as an LM statistic) and an exponential
average of the F-statistics, the so-called exponential Wald statistics (which is most powerful
against distant local alternatives in a sense made precise in Andrews and Ploberger (1991)). The




(A3c) A? exp-W =ln{(T2t&iXT9tsexp(½F.r(k))}
Because these tests involve increasingly many single-break F statistics, conventional
distribution theory cannot be used to obtain their limiting distribution. However, their limiting
-45-distribution is readily obtained by applying the functional central limit theorem and the
Continuous mapping theory. To obtain these limits, suppose that t0IT -Aas T -.. Let"=>"





(A.4c) AP exp-W =>ln{JXexp(tsF(s))ds}
where F(s) =Bk(s)'Bk(s)/(s(l-s)),where Bk(s) is a k-dimensional Brownian bridge, that is,
Bk(s) =Wk(s)-Wk(l),where Wk(s) is a standard k-dimensional Brownian motion on the unit
interval. For extensions of these results to the ease that some regressors are 1(1), see Banerjee,
Lumsdaine and Stock (1992) and Hansen (1992).Thelimiting representations in (A.4) facilitate
the computation of the limiting distributions under the null and thus of the critical values for
the tests.
A.2 CUSUM-type Tests.
An intuitively appealing test for structural breaks is the CUSUM statistic proposed by
Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975). This test rejects if the time series models systematically
over- or under-forecastsmore precisely, if the cumulated one-step-ahead forecast errors,
computed recursively, tend to be either too positive or negative. Ploberger and Kramer (1992a,
1992b) proposed a modification of this statistic which is computationally simpler because it is
based on full-sample residuals rather than recursive residuals. Let e be the residuals from the
OLS fit of (Al), and let ST(k) denote the standardized partial sum process of these residuals,
that is, S1-(k) =(&2T)½X..ies,where 2 is the usual OLS estimator of 2• The two
statistics considered here are,
-46-(A.Sa) P-K max maxk, TPT(
(A5b) P-K Ineansq =T1(S1.(k))2
The P-K meansq statistic was previously proposed by MacNeill (1978) as a test for parameter
stability.
The limiting distribution of these statistics is readily obtained using the functional central
limit theorem and the continuous mapping theorem. Because the regressors are 1(0) by
assumption, under the null hypothesis the residual partial sum process has the limit, S.r(•IT) >
B1(.),where B is a one-dimensional Brownian bridge on the unit intervaL By the continuous
mapping theorem, we have,
(A3a) P-K max =sup0
(A3b) P-K meansq =f(B1(s))2ds,
which can be used to obtain limiting distributions under the null.
These tests have nontrivial local asymptotic power only against shifts in the intercept term,
assuming the regressors are mean zero and stationary: a shift in the coefficient fiina
neighborhood will remain asymptotically undetected, since the sample mean of x is consistent
for zero (formal results proceed following Ploberger and Kramer (i990))
A3 Nyblom's (1989) Tests for Time-Varyine Parameters.
A different alternative hypothesis is that the parameters of the process are stochastic and
follow a random walk. Nyblom (1989) considered the more general alternative that the
parameters follow a martingale, a special case of which is the single-break model (A.2), and
-47-LM tests against the random walk alternative. He considered the case that all the parameters
are time-varying, but in our application we are interested as well in testing the hypothesis that
a subset of the parameters are time-varying. Let R be a qxk matrix of known constants, so
that the null hypothesis is that REnt fit? =R[afi'j'andthe alternative is that,
(A.6) H1: R[n fi'f ç, ç =+Vt Vt i.i.d. (0p2)
where(v1 VT)and (1 CT) are independent. It is maintained that Rt[at fir? -
Rt[afi']'= whereRt is the complement of R in E1. In the linear regression model
(Al) and the alternative hypothesis (A.6) with jointly normal i.i.d. errora, Nyblom's (1989)
test is,
(A.7) L =T]ilVTOy(RER')VT(i),
where E is the OLS variance-covariance matrix of (a, fi)andVT is the partial sum process,
V.1-(2) =T..1e5[1xa']'.
In the special case that R tests only the constancy of the intercept, because the regressors
have mean zero this test is asymptotically equivalent to the P-K meanaq atatiatic. In general,
however, these tests differ. Under the null hypothesis, cx is a martingale difference
sequence. Thus the asymptotic null representation of the statistic is,
(A.8) L =>fOBk(s)Bk(a)da.
For Monte Carlo results comparing these teats in the linear regression model, see Andrews,
Lee and Ploberger (1992).
-48-Footnotes
1. The Federal Reserve Board staff biannually presents to the FOMC simulations of a
macroeconometric model which emphasize the direct effect of alternative interest rate levels on
inflation and real economic activity (rather than through a monetary aggregate), and some
members of the committee undoubtedly see their votes in these terms.
2. Specifically, the long-run interest semielasticities were estimated using the dynamic OLS
procedure in Stock and Watson (1989a) with four leads and lags, with standard errors computed
using an AR(2) model for the regression error. The estimated long-run interest semielasticity
of M2 demand is .0061 (standard error .0020), based on the 90-day Treasury bill rate. The
DOLS regression was run over 60-2 -91:2, withthe remaining observations used for initial and
terminal conditions.
3. The in-sample 's are typically larger for the real GDP and inflation regressions (not
reported here) than they are for the nominal GD? regressions. This might at first appear
puzzling, since nominal GDP growth is the sum of real GDP growth and GD? inflation.
However, over this period real GD? growth and inflation growth, and especially their
predictable components, have been negatively correlated, that is, predictably high inflation has
been associated with predictable slow real growth. For example, in a VAR(3) with real GDP,
GDP inflation, M2, and R-90, the in-sample forecasts of one-quarter inflation and real GD?
growth from 1960-2 -19922have a cross-correlation of -.50, while their forecast errors have a
correlation of .07.
4. Friedman and Kuttner's (1992a) regression 3 in their table lb and regression 2 in our table
1 are the most directly comparable. Both regress quarterly nominal output growth on lagged
growth of nominal output and M2.Friedmanand Kuttner use 4 lags over 1970-3 -1990-4and
nominal ON?, and report an F-statistic of 237. Using nominal GD? rather than nominal
ON?, over 1970-3-1990-4 with 4 lags this F-statistic is 2.85 (p-value .030). The p-value of the
test of the hypothesis that three lags of both M2 and GD? are adequate is .69. Using 3 lags
-49-and nominal GDP, 1970.3 -199&.4,the Granger causality statistic is 3.87 (p-value .012). Using
the 197&3 -1992:2sample, with 4 lags it is 3.39 (p-value .013; the test of 3 vs. 4 lags for M2
and GDP has a p-value of .71) and with 3 lags it is 4.80 (p-value .004), the value in our table
1, regression 2. The remaining differences presumably are accounted for by their use of GNP
rather than GDP and by data revisions.
5.Incontrast to the general lack of rejections in table 4, there is more evidence of instability
in comparable equations which forecast real GDP. The evidence of instability is quite strong
when GDP inflation is the dependent variable: at least one test rejects at the 5%levelin 10 of
the 12 regressions involving M2. The estimated break dates occur early in the sample, most
commonly 67:2 and 71L
6. The cointegrating residuals ZMD in the regressions in table 6 and 7 are based on long-run
monetary base and Ml demand relations, respectively, estimated using the 90-day Treasury bill
rate, using the same estimation procedure as applied to the M2 cointegrating vector as discussed
in Section 4. The interest semielasticities are .0503 (.0172) for base money and .0737 (.0304)
for Ml. The evidence that the monetary base system is cointegrated is weak, however, so the
F-statistics involving ZMD for the base should be interpreted cautiously; this term is included
for the base for comparability to the results for Ml and M2. We suspect that these F-statistics
Overstate the predictive content of the base; see Ljungqvist, Park, Stock and Watson (1988).
7. The choice of a one-quarter lag in the money growth rules represents an attempt to
incorporate realistic lags in data availability. Many important series are available monthly with
no lag or lags of at most eight weeks; these include interest rates, employment and
unemployment, industrial production, and personal income. However, other key series are
available with lags exceeding one quarter. In particular, advance GDP estimates are not
available until four weeks after the end of the quarter, and revised estimates are available later
yet, so that the availability lag for GDP is at least one quarter plus four weeks, arguably longer.
The one-quarter availability lag used here represents a compromise among these various true
availability lags.
-50-& Technically, to compute the conditional distribution we would need to draw A(L) from the
conditional distribution of A(L) given l(L), where lz(L) is given by the expression
following (6 Instead, A(L) was drawn from its unconditional distribution. Sampling from
the conditional distribution with these nonlinear restrictions would be computationally
prohibitive and is beyond the scope of this investigation.
9. It does not follow that anymoneygrowth rule results in modest improvements. For
example, letting m =.4x+.ómi(so that money growth increases when nominal output is
above its target) is destabilizing and results in a point estimate of 4-quarter rGDP of 1.70.
10. For an earlier discussion of this subject, see Feldstein (1991, 1992).
11. This point is developed in Feldstein (1991).
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Notes: 9?, 2(2) and 2(4) respsctively the from regressions of one-,
two-, and four-quarter growth of the dependent variable onto a constant and three
lags of the listed regressors. Data sources and transformations are given in
appendix A. The F-ocaciscics (p-valueo in parentheses) test the restriction that
coefficients on the indicated regressors are zero. In the regressions including the
money demand cointegrating residual 2ND, the F-statistics on 9(2 include the test of
this restriction.Table 2
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Predictive Content of ))2
Depe2(dent Variable: Nominal GOP Growth
Estication period: quarterly, 1970:3 to1992:2
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Notes: ZND was computed using the full-sazple estimated cointegrating vector.
See the notes to table 1.Table 4
Tests for Structural Breaks and Tine-Varying Parameters with 1(2
Dependent Variable: Nominal GD? Growth
Estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2
Notes: significant at the *10%; **5%; ***l% level. The fixed-date Chowtest
('Chow') has a break date of 1979:3. Because this break date is erguably data-
dependent, as discussed in the text the critical values for this atatistic ere
difficult to ascertain and the reportedsignificance levels for this statistic
(based on the standard F distribution) are at best erough guide.
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Notes: See the notes totable 1.Table 6
Predictive Content of Ml
Dependent Variable: Nominal GOP Growth
Estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2
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Notes: See the notea to table 1.Table 7
Tests for Structural Breaks and Time-VaryingParameterswith Monetary Base
Dependent Variable: Nominal GD? Growth
Estimation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2
Notes: significant at the *10%; **5%; ***l% level. See the notes to table 4.
to.O.scss.eo. QLO Hoc-ChowOP twrs2tao.P-K e.oP-K ...nsqL.iLL00w
0POOPo.asc 32.20°°'00.82"'13.46'"50:225.63'''1.36''0.75"2.42*"1.l1**
2POOP0220a—so 35.40'"16.50"05.07'"60:430.53°"0.30 0.03 0.30'1.16
3COOP052!a—pP ss.oo"05.25"14.09"'80:125.77"'ass''too"2.18 0.96
4POOP0200a—soa—op so,7a'—'20.55*'17.30"80:335.55"'5.67 0.09 2.66 1.34
5lOOPPOOP0230 53.00"'24.37*''17.6k"75:236.60"0.96 0.22 2.63"0.95'
P66000oco0250a—so ss.i7'"23.70°''06.60'" 50:435.75*"0.47'' 0.61"2.66 1.02
7P0OPPOOPa500a—pr 3a -so"oo.eo"'25. 75"81:002.37"'1.68'' 1. ae"2.44 0.68
SsOOPP0200a—soom 31,21"25.35*.'21.55"60:443. 37"0.58 0.272.86 0.00
8PPOOP020!0—80P000.010 32.57"30.67*"22.24"60:444.17"2.52"1,32"0.sa 8.05
00PPOOP0220a—el cop_osmm 60.52°"Oo.ao"Oe.13"80:440.92"1.86"0.98"3.06 0.53
0166000pocp02.20a—so ooo_oi060 51.53*"3o.sa**'22.75"00:6ss.se"0.66°'0.41"3.17 0.63Table B
Tests for Structural Breaks end Time-Varying Parameters with NI.
Dependent Variable: Nominal GDP Growth
Eotioation period: quarterly, 1960:2 to 1992:2
Notes: significant at the *10%; **5%; ***j% level. See the notea to table 4.
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Estimated Performance Under Optimal COP Targetting Rule
Ratio of standard deviations- of quarterly, semiannual, and annual growth
rates or changes, controlled vs. uncontrolled system, over a ten-year span
VariableAgg'n i meanStd.Dev.median10% pt 90% ptFract<l












































Notes:The entry in the third column istheestimatedreduction in the
standard deviation of the variable given in the first column, temporally
aggregated over the number of quarters given in the second column, were the
system controlled using the optimal controller derived for the indicated
control variable. The remaining columns summarize the distribution of the
sample realizations of r over a ten-year span were the optimal rule, computed
using the 1960-92 data, implemented in the future; these distributions
incorporate both parameter and shock uncertainty, as discussed in the text.
Data transformations are as given in the appendix. Estimation period: 1960:2
-1992:2.Based on 2000 Monte Carlo replications.Table 10
Estimated Performance Under Partial Adjustment GOP Targetting Rule
Ratio of standard deviations of quarterly, semiannual, and annual growth
rates or changes, controlled vs. uncontrolled system, over a ten-year span
VariableAgg'n ? meanStd.Oev.median10% pt90% ptFract<1


















































Notes: Ratios of standard deviations were computed using the partial
adjustment nominal GOP targetting rule, m —Axti+(l-A)m1where A —
.4,as discussed in the text. See the notes to table 9.Table 11
RNSE's of Forecast of Four-Quarter Growth in Nominal Output,
1971:1 to 1991:2
Forecasting system RMSE
Constsnt only -71:2-91:2sample: 2.76
Recursive Time Series forecasts:
1.Constant 2.89
2. VAR(3): RCDP, POOP 2.68
3. VAR(3):ROOF,POOP, FM2 2.37
4. VAR(3): ROOP, POOP, FM2,FYGM3 2.26
5. VAR(3): ROOF, POOP, FM2, FYCM3, POlL 2.20
Professional forecasts:
6. ORI, 4-quarter 2.27
7. ASSA/NEER, 4-quarter 2.26
Notes: All RMSE's refer to annual forecasts made from 1971:1 to 1991:2. For
the rime series models, the forecasts are of nominal CDP growth, computed using
recursive regression with three lags of the indicated variable. For example,
the forecast of COP growth from 71:1 to 72:1 in model 2 was computed by
regressing ln(CDP/CDP4) onto (1, Zr4. where is quarterly
real COP growth and quarterly inflation in quarter t, with a regression period
of 1960:21970:4 with earlier observations for initial conditions; for the
71:2 forecast, the regressions were reestimared using data through 71:1, etc.
The ORI and ASA/NBER forecasts are of 4-quarrer GNP and are evaluated relative
to 4-quarter GNP growth. The entry in the first line uses es the forecast the
average 4-quarter growth rate of nominal COP over 71:1 -91:2,so this RMSE is
fiT5/n riaes the standard deviation of four-quarter output growth over
71:1 -91:2.Figure 1.
Four-quarter growth of (a) M2 (dashed line) and nominal GDP (solid line
(b)M2 andGDP inflation; and (c) M2 and real ODP, 1960- 1991
(a) Annual Nominal CDP growth and M2
Year
Year
(b)Annual GDP deflator growth and M2
Year
(c) Annual Real GDP growth and M2Figure 2.
Four-quarter growth of (a) the monetary base (dashed line) and nominal GDP (solid line)
(b) monetary base and GDP inflation; and (c) monetary base and real GDP, 1960- 1992.
(a) Annual Nominal GDP growth and Money Base
Year
Year
(b) Annual GOP deflator growth and Money Base
Year
(o) Annual Real ODP growth and Money BaseFigure 3.
Four-quarter growth of (a) Ml (dashed line) and nominal GDP (solid line)
(b) Ml and GDP inflation; and (c) Ml and real GDP, 1960 -199Z
(a)Annual NominalGDPgrowth and Ml
Year
Year
(b) Annual CDP deflator growth and Ml
Year










Actual and simulated historical values of four-quarter growth of nominal GDP:
Optimal nominal GDP targeting rule, 1960- 1992
Actual:solid line; simulation: dashed line
gdp














Impulseresponse functions: Optimal GD? targeting rule
Response of money growth after k quarters, relative to its mean,
to a one-standard-deviation shock in the equations for
nominal GDP (solid line) GD? inflation (dashed line) the interest rate (dotted line)
2 4 6 8 101214161820gdp
Actual and simulated historical values of four-quarter growth of nominal GDP:
Partial-adjustment GD? targeting rule, 1960- 1992
Actual:solid line; simulation: dashed line
Figure 6Impulse response functions: Partial-adjustment GDP targeting rule
Response of money growth after k quarters, relative to its mean,
to a one-standard-deviation shock in the equations for
nominal GDP (solid line) GDP inflation (dashed line) the interest rate (dotted line)
Figure